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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 05-5540
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
CRAIG MASON,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Judge: Hon. Gene E.K. Pratter
(04-cr-00720)
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
 June 14, 2007
Before: McKEE, STAPLETON, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed:  July 27, 2007)
_____________
OPINION
_____________
McKEE, Circuit Judge
Craig Mason  appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress
claiming that the government failed to establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory
stop of his car under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).  For the reasons that follow,
1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s
findings of fact for clear error, and conduct plenary review of that court’s application of law to
those facts.  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002).  
2
we will affirm.1 
Mason argues that police had insufficient information to support an investigatory
stop.  The Fourth Amendment allows police to “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when
the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois
v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).  In determining whether circumstances warrant
this intrusion, “the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture-must be taken into
account.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).  Accordingly, “even
factors independently ‘susceptible to innocent explanation’ can collectively amount to
reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 252 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Moreover,  police officers may rely  “on their own experience and specialized training to
make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them
that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’”  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274,
273 (2000).
Given this standard, the District Court correctly determined that the police had
sufficient information to justify a brief investigatory detention of Mason’s car under
Terry. When Pennsylvania Narcotics Agent Alan Basewitz inspected the crate in
question, he found the crate’s construction and labels consistent with that of other drug
shipments.  Later, Mason was observed waiting at the specified address and leaving
2 Agent Alan Basewitz had been a narcotics agent since 1990.  Supervisory Agent Phillip
Delvin was a six-year veteran of the DEA and made the decision to detain the Mason.
3
shortly after the crate was delivered.  Mason was alone throughout this period and there
was no other suspect at the scene.  Accordingly, suspicion surrounding the delivery of the
crate focused solely on him.  See United States v. Goodrich, 450 F.3d 552, 561, 563 (3d
Cir. 2006).  
 Although no one fact would have justified the brief intrusion that accompanies a
Terry stop, the combination of these factors combined with the mobility resulting from
Mason leaving the location of the garage after receiving the shipment, was sufficient to
arouse the reasonable suspicion of a trained narcotics officer.2  “A reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity may be formed by observing exclusively legal activity.” United States v.
Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2000).
  When the experience of these officers is added to the overall scope of the
situation, the totality of the circumstances warranted reasonable suspicion that the
Appellant was engaging in criminal activity. See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18.  It was not
necessary for the police to have reason to believe Mason had drugs in his car.  It was
sufficient that they had a reasonable suspicion that he was currently involved in a drug
business involving the drugs at the house.  Upon review of the district court’s decision,
we can find no error.
The order of the District Court denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress is
affirmed.  
